That's when one is supposed to employ their common sense for semantic disambiguation. Spoken languages are not programming languages. I for one found it easy to parse.
This is because it is valley jargon and we are all saturated with it. You may not have heard it before, but it is structurally close to similar concepts, eg "frontier model", that you got there without noticing.
It was still shit tier comms for communicating with the whole planet, but yes, for the inner loop, it was succinct and clear.
Valley jargon isn't a nerd vs jock thing these days, and hasn't been for a good while. It's more quasi-intellectual sophistry sprinkled with tech vocabulary.
People claiming they don't understand or are confused by relatively simple English is a surprisingly common genre of comments on HN. I wonder what causes the people here to have these feelings towards English; my guess is indeed that many people here judge English as if it were a programming language.
That is certainly one possible explanation, but I think another likely explanation is that once your brain learn programming, especially logic, data structures & algorithms, you just start seeing the ambiguity in non-programmers' writing so much more clearly.
Kind of. First of all, reasoning LLMs can also do (a form of) reasoning. Second, yes you could say LLMs form a sort of intuition, but its domain is the space of human-produced text. It only translates to real world intuition to the degree that those intuitions make their way into the corpus the model has been trained on. You could say that, when it comes to anything other than textual prediction, their intuition is secondary, a reflection of a reflection, so it will always lag behind that of humans.
Intuition also takes effort, just of a different type and quality. It's the difference from mindlessly applying memorization and simple inference/recombinations (basically delegating to our own internal LLM) versus deeply contemplating the meaning of certain mathematical objects, looking for intuitive analogues etc. I would say the second takes more effort and seriousness. The first is more like brute-forcing a problem.
Sounds like you weren't paying attention. A lot of dog owners don't, so it's not at all unusual in my experience. The only thing I'd push back on is of dogs having thoughts, everything else checks out.
On dogs [not] having thoughts, do you say this based on the premise that thoughts are necessarily articulated (internally verbalized)? That seems to be a fairly popular perspective in discussions about human thought. But as to that (not to strawman or anything) I see it as just one of various forms of mental imagery[1] that can arise from something that I would say already arguably constitutes a thought.
That kind of unsymbolized thoughtform is fragile in my experience, as it strongly tends toward crystallizing into some kind of mental imagery. But I find it's possible in the right conditions to be conscious of chains of wordless, imageless propositional thoughts (by which I mean thoughts with truth values, of course, but also ones that are "propositional" in the sense of considering a plan of action or a causal chain).
Does it mean that dogs are evaluating truth conditions in the same manner but merely lack the linguistic components? I don't know; maybe that's wishful thinking. But they appear to have structured modeling/reasoning of causal and spatial relations in a way that's at least functionally equivalent to propositional thought.
1. That is, rather than just "images" or visualizations, the full spectrum of sensory/perceptual/motor emulations that can be experienced. See, for example, <https://hurlburt.faculty.unlv.edu/codebook.html>, though I'm not sure if this covers everything. I think there is, for example, a kinesthetic form of mental imagery -- which I would suggest is what coaches [don't know they] really mean when they tell you to visualize an action -- that consists of aborted motor commands that are still expressed just enough for their purpose (cf. the mostly aborted motor commands to the vocal cords, lips, etc. that can be observed in a person subvocalizing while reading).
You're right. I knew language is not necessary for cognition, but I always thought of thought as just internal monologue, i.e. "trains of thought". It turns out the definition they use in cognitive science is "the manipulation of internal mental representations to guide behavior, solve problems, and model the world in the absence of direct sensory input". Which doesn't require language either.
Probably it's this linguistic component, together withs shared intentionality/cooperation, that makes all of the difference when it comes to the power of human cognition, so I wouldn't say animals merely lack this component, but it's true that they appear to have pretty much everything else we do.
Lots of humans have no inner monologue. I think mostly in abstract shapes, spatial relations, and interactions. If anything I find the idea of thinking in linear sentences limiting.
I've had a two different dogs do this independently by now:
They'll be laying down happily napping. Then they get up, walk to a different room, and some seconds later come back carrying a toy. They return to where they used to lay, lay down again, and put the toy on their front paws.
I don't know what else that was than the thought of wanting one of their favorite toys there for comfort. (Familiar-smelling things are comforting to dogs.)
You don't seem to have grasped Terry Tao's (and others') criticisms. Basically they are saying that the advancement you get is illusory. Most of the time, it doesn't give you any new capabilities or deep understanding, instead you get an inhibiting of human exploration and ensuing expansion of our real understanding in that particular (sub)field. It's non-intuitive, since from a purely logical standpoint you've only added another set of known truths to the ones we already knew about before. The issue only becomes apparent when one considers the larger context of human collective truth and meaning making.
All you get is a new, likely to be useless fact, together with the opaque proof of that fact. There are no known or forseeable applications to the finding that there are singularities in the idealized flow. What you lose OTOH, are the many deep mathematical insights humans motivated by the search would have stumbled upon on the way to that fact and which are much more likely to lead to real-world applications. It's these insights that are truly productive, not settling mathematical points, however iconic these might be.
I think the error you're making is that you're assuming these systems have the same mathematical capability as humans (or better). But that's not the case, nor would an informed prediction be that they surely will get there soon enough if technological evolution keeps apace. That would be akin to believing a hiker will reach the moon if they will just keep ascending the mountain. "But look, they are making such good progress!"
And yet you terminated. Which would be the correct thing to do if Marxist philosophy would be wrong on all counts, as you explicitly state. Which of course, it isn't.
They're probably referring to tech like reasoning models, or agent harnesses for example, which are arguably slowly moving things towards the symbolic end of the spectrum.
Sure, but the same must be true for these models as well. They must be doing some form of reasoning, even if it's not formally correct and it relies instead on all kind of half-assed heuristics which only work inside certain unexamined boundaries, which leads to wrong conclusions when those boundaries are being trespassed, etc. And even if it's not the reasoning they report when asked. But all this can't be that different to how humans reason most of the time either.
I suspect humans have other ways that help with error correction and guiding the reasoning effort, but that's another story.
> They must be doing some form of reasoning, even if it's not formally correct and ...
Surely it is worthwhile to attempt to understand the details of that? And if we seek human equivalent performance then it is reasonable to wonder if the reasoning achieved to date is the "correct" sort.
Human languages aren't just a set of more or less arbitrary conventions relating groups of sounds with meanings. Language is probably humanity's greatest and most advanced technology, making most of the other ones possible. And it's also art and play, a repository of original wisdom encoded in the various etymologies. It steers thinking down certain pathways in ways which are hard to even point to - because it would be a bit like the finger trying to point at itself. They are collectively created artifacts which encode the wisdom of generations. The deeper, wider and more diverse that pool, the more powerful the product. A human language invented by one person or by a group of people cannot ever compare in depth and richness to the languages most people use to communicate and think.
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